One of the most common security mistakes we see in small business Microsoft 365 environments: multiple employees with Global Administrator access.
It usually happens innocently. The business owner sets things up, makes themselves an admin, then gives the same access to their office manager “in case something needs to be done.” Then maybe the bookkeeper needs admin access to fix a billing issue. Before long, five people have the keys to everything.
Most business owners don’t set out to create a security problem. They’re focused on keeping operations running, and giving someone admin access is just the fastest way to solve the immediate issue. But this shortcut has real consequences.
Why Global Admin Access Is a Security Risk
A Global Administrator can do anything in your Microsoft 365 environment. Create accounts, delete accounts, access any mailbox, change security settings, wipe devices, export all company data. Everything.
When that account gets compromised through phishing, password reuse, or a malware infection, the attacker inherits all of those capabilities.
We have seen this play out firsthand. In one case, an attacker who gained Global Admin access created hidden admin accounts for persistence, set up mail forwarding rules to intercept sensitive communications, and disabled security features to avoid detection. The business didn’t realize they had been compromised for three weeks because the attacker was careful not to trigger obvious alerts.
The risk scales with the number of Global Admin accounts. One compromised admin account is a crisis. Five potential entry points with full access is reckless.
What Microsoft Recommends
Microsoft’s guidance is clear: limit Global Administrator accounts to no more than five, and ideally two to four. These should be break-glass accounts for emergencies and your IT provider, not everyday user accounts.
Your Microsoft Secure Score actively penalizes you for excessive Global Admin accounts. If you are trying to improve your security posture or pass a vendor security assessment, this is one of the first things to address.
Use Role-Based Access Instead
Microsoft 365 includes dozens of specific admin roles that provide access to exactly what someone needs and nothing more.
Here are the roles we see small businesses use most often:
User Administrator can create and manage user accounts, reset passwords, and manage licenses. This is typically assigned to whoever handles onboarding and offboarding.
Exchange Administrator can manage mailboxes, distribution lists, and mail flow rules. This goes to whoever handles email administration.
SharePoint Administrator can manage SharePoint sites and OneDrive settings. This is for whoever manages file sharing and permissions.
Teams Administrator can manage Teams settings, channels, and meeting policies. This goes to whoever is responsible for Teams governance.
Billing Administrator can manage subscriptions, view invoices, and update payment information. This is typically the bookkeeper or finance person.
Helpdesk Administrator can reset passwords for non-admin users. This is useful for an internal IT contact who handles basic support requests.
The principle is simple. Someone who needs to reset passwords doesn’t need the ability to delete your entire SharePoint environment. Someone managing Teams settings doesn’t need access to billing information. Role-based access enforces this separation automatically.
Setting Up Proper Admin Access
Step 1: Audit your current Global Admins. In the Microsoft 365 admin centre, go to Users, then Active Users, and filter by Admin roles. You might be surprised how many Global Admins exist.
Step 2: Determine actual needs. For each person with admin access, ask what they actually need to do. In most cases, a specific role covers their requirements without granting universal access.
Step 3: Reassign appropriate roles. Remove Global Admin access and assign the specific roles needed. Document who has what access and why.
Step 4: Protect remaining Global Admin accounts. The accounts that genuinely need Global Admin access should have strong, unique passwords not used anywhere else, multi-factor authentication (mandatory, not optional), Conditional Access policies restricting where they can sign in from, and regular review of sign-in logs for unusual activity.
Privileged Identity Management for Extra Security
For businesses with Microsoft 365 E5 or Entra ID P2 licensing, Privileged Identity Management (PIM) adds another layer of protection.
Instead of having permanent admin access, users request elevated permissions when needed. The access is time-limited, maybe two hours to complete a specific task, then automatically revokes. Every elevation is logged with justification.
This means even if an attacker compromises an account that can become a Global Admin, they would need to go through the elevation process, which creates alerts and audit trails.
PIM is not necessary for every small business, but it is worth considering if you handle sensitive data or face strict compliance requirements.
How This Connects to Vendor Security Assessments
If you are going through vendor security screening for an enterprise client, expect questions about administrative access controls. Common questions include how many users have administrative access to your systems, whether you follow the principle of least privilege, how you manage and review privileged access, and whether admin accounts are protected with MFA.
“Everyone who needs it has Global Admin” is not a good answer. “We use role-based access control with specific admin roles assigned based on job function, and our Global Admin accounts are limited to two break-glass accounts with MFA enforced” demonstrates mature security practices.
We have helped multiple clients pass vendor security screenings by cleaning up exactly this kind of access sprawl. It is one of the most straightforward improvements you can make to your security posture, and assessors notice.
Where to Start
If you are starting from a messy admin situation, here is the priority order:
- Enable MFA on all existing admin accounts today. This is non-negotiable.
- Identify who actually needs Global Admin. Usually it is just your IT provider and one break-glass account the business owner controls.
- Reassign everyone else to specific roles. Most resistance disappears when people realize they can still do their jobs with a more targeted role.
- Remove Global Admin from daily-use accounts. Admin accounts should be separate from the accounts people use for email and everyday work.
- Document the access structure. Who has what access and why. Review quarterly.
The Bottom Line
Global Admin access is powerful and dangerous. Most people who have it don’t need it and wouldn’t notice if it were replaced with a more appropriate role.
Cleaning this up takes an hour or two and immediately reduces your attack surface, improves your Secure Score, and puts you in a better position for vendor security assessments. There is no good reason not to do it.
Need help with your Microsoft 365 admin management? Reach out to learn how we can help.
